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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Arms control agreement signed by over 160 nati ons. T his 
rreary seeks to hair rhe spread of nuclea r weapons to 
nations rhar do nor possess rhem and rhus limit rh e num-
ber of nuclear-a rmed scares. Ir is fo rmally rirl ed rh e Treaty 
o n rl1e Non-Pro li fe rat ion of N uclea r Weapons. 
T he rreary's major objecti ve is to perperuare rh e mo-
nopoly held by rhe fi ve declared nuclear-armed scares 
(U ni ted tares, Russia, Uni ted Kingdom, France, C hina) 
and thus combat rhe "Nrh nati on" problem stemming 
from proliferati o n. The assumption is rh ar each new nu-
clear stare increa e rhe likelihood of nuclear war. The 
trea ty was signed by G rea r Britain , the Soviet Union, and 
rhe U nited rares on July I , 1968, and was initially rari-
fi ed by fo rry no nnuclea r scares before ir enrered inro force 
on M arch 5, 1970. 
T he co re of the treaty concerns rhe transference of nu-
clea r weaponry and technology. N uclear-armed stares and 
nonnuclea r-armed rates borh have obligations ro ensure 
rhar nuclear weapons do nor proliferate, according ro the 
rreary. T he nuclea r powers are obliga ted nor ro aid non-
nuclea r-armed stares to acquire nuclea r weaponry and ro 
promote the peaceful uses of nuclea r energy. Nonnuclear-
armed sca res are to refrain from manufacturing or ac-
quiring nuclea r weapon and ro accept the safeguards pro-
vided by rhe International Aromic Energy Agency 
rega rding their peaceful nuclear pursuits. 
T he bas ing of nuclea r weapo ns by a nuclear power on 
a n nnuclear stare's territory i nor affected by this treaty. 
T he threat of "nuclear blackmail" for the nonnuclear 
stares rhar sign rhe rreary i coun tered by the guarantee 
of assistance from the nuclea r rare if such a threa t arises. 
Such as i ranee has nor been specified, however. Any parry 
may withdraw from the rreary by giving three months' 
nonce. 
C hina and France repre ented rhe rwo declared nuclear 
powers that fo r decades did nor rake parr in this treaty. 
Nor unci! March 9, and August 3, 1992 respectively, did 
C hina and France formal ly adhere to rh e rreary. On May 
11 , 1995, the N PT Extensio n Co n fe rence made rhis 
rreaty permanent by acclamatio n . T he co nfe rence also 
produced a commi tment by rh e nuclear powers ro a com-
prehensive res t ban in 1996 and yearly co mpliance as-
sessmencs beginning in 1997. 
Criticism of rhe rreaty has focused on irs inherenr in-
equali ty. The provisions are ro ugher o n nonnuclear-
weapons srares rhan on rhe nuclea r powers. T his inherent 
inequal ity, ir has been argued wirh limited success, is offser 
by rhe good-faith negoriarions provision embodied in ar-
ticl e 6, which ulrimarely seeks to es tablish a comprehen-
sive resr ban . Even harsher criticism , however, stems from 
Western arms concrol experts who view rhe treaty as ir-
relevant ro arms control. Stares such as Liech rensrein and 
H airi , which signed rhe treaty, had no chance of acquiring 
nuclear weapons anyway, and m any nonsignaro ry srares 
such as Pakistan, India, and Israel have recently acquired 
nuclear weapons. 
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Nuclear Power 
In a resolution adopted in 1975 focusing on energy and 
the environment, rhe Council of Europe stared rhar nu-
clear power was ro become one of tl1e principal sources 
of furure energy supply. The council mandated ti1e study 
of issues associated with rhe development of nuclear 
power, such as reactor safety, risks of radiation, release of 
hear, radioactive waste, and recycling of nuclear fu el. 
These issues began to be extensively researched starring in 
1985 widcin the European Atomic Energy Commission 
(Eurarom). 
The prominent development of nuclear energy in 
~esrern Europe starred in t11e early 1970s and in rensified 
111 1973 following rhe Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries' (OPEC) decision to place controls on 
